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ABSTRACT

This booklet, part of a video and print educational unit consisting of a student text, a teacher's guide, and four 30-minute videotapes, focuses on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, attempting to distinguish what guides each nation's actions in the world as a whole and with each other. Chapter 1, "Differing World Views," examines how differing geographies, economic systems, and political structures contribute to the competing world views of the United States and the Soviet Union. Chapter 2, "Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations," examines the evolution of the current U.S.-Soviet relationship. Topics include the Russian Revolution, World War II, the Cold War, bipolar politics, the Cuban Missile Crisis, detente, and arms control. Chapter 3, "A Critical Issue: The Arms Race," highlights the arms race as the issue that causes the most friction between the superpowers. A history of the arms race is presented, its current state is assessed, and its future course is briefly discussed. In chapter 4, "In Pursuit of Peace," distinguished U.S. and Soviet leaders give their opinions of the direction in which U.S.-Soviet relations should proceed. The viewpoints of U.S. Army General Omar Bradley, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, and U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon are presented. A glossary of terms is provided. Twenty-eight references are included. (GEA)

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CLOSE UP Special Focus:

U.S.-Soviet Relations

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CLOSE UP Special Focus:

U.S.-Soviet Relations

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Introduction

Discussions of U.S.-Soviet relations usually focus on ideological conflict: capitalism versus communism, democracy versus totalitarianism, good versus bad. The ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are in fact great ones and are important to understand. But the competing ideologies are only part of the story.

To understand more fully the problem-ridden U.S.-Soviet relationship, we must try to learn what guides each nation's actions in the world and with each other. To do that, we must consider how each views the world. We also need to study each nation's political system and its decision-making process in order to understand its values and how these values are translated into policy.

The first chapter of *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations* looks at the political and economic systems that each nation is committed to preserving. We will also examine the geographic considerations that influence the foreign policy of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The second chapter examines the evolution of the current U.S.-Soviet relationship so we can put it into perspective.

The third chapter highlights the spiraling arms race—the issue that causes the most friction between the superpowers and yet the issue on which it is vitally important that they reach some accord.

Finally, we look to the future, in an effort to understand the existing potential for both conflict and cooperation.

Differing World Views

IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

- How do each of the following affect a country's strength and its sense of being secure from invasion?
  a) its geographic size
  b) the size of its population
  c) the number of foreign countries it borders
  d) its natural resources
  e) solidarity among its people
- How do the economic systems of capitalism and communism treat the following?
  a) private ownership of property
  b) the role of the government in the economy
- Does the United States have a purely capitalist system? Does the Soviet Union have a purely communist system?
- What is the difference between socialism and communism?
- Do the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union have anything in common?
- Why does a nation need a political system?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the American political system? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet political system?
- What, if anything, do the U.S. and Soviet political systems have in common? How are they different?
- What role does the Communist party play in Soviet society?
- How is the Communist party different from political parties in the United States?

The United States and the Soviet Union are the most powerful nations on earth. Their economic wealth far surpasses that of other nations. They have enough weapons to destroy the entire world. Yet, the United States and the Soviet Union are adversaries. They look at the world—and each other—in different ways. Their relationship is marked by rivalry and suspicion.

The United States believes that the Soviets are trying to establish communist nations throughout the world—by force if necessary. The United States views itself as an international police officer, holding aggressive Soviet behavior in check. The Soviets believe that the United States is trying to isolate them and curtail their influence in the world. They see themselves surrounded by enemies and believe that the United States and its allies would like nothing better than to overthrow their communist government. Soviet leaders believe that they must be eternally vigilant against the threat posed by western democracies.

What forces shape these views? This chapter examines how differing geographies, economic systems, and political structures contribute to the competing world views of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Importance of Geopolitics

A nation's foreign policy is affected by its geographic location in the world, the size of its population, its natural resources, and the size and strength of the nations that surround it. Each of these factors by itself is of limited importance. Taken together, they define the strengths and weaknesses that allow a nation to develop a certain foreign policy. For instance, a large country may seem more powerful than its tiny neighbor. But is its population large enough to defend it in time of war? What about its economic strength? The tiny nation of Japan is considered an "economic giant," while its much larger neighbor, the People's Republic of China, remains constrained by its lack of economic development.

In addition to the strengths and weaknesses presented by its geography and *demography*, a nation's foreign policy reflects the stability and instability of its political structures. While the people of Italy may joke about the frequency with which their government changes (Italian governments have at times changed more than once a month), a nation's standing in the world suffers when its leadership is unstable. Even the powerful United States is often criticized for the "flip-flops" in its foreign policy that result from electoral changes that may occur every four years.

This section looks at some of the geographic and political (or "geopolitical") factors that influence U.S. and

Soviet foreign policy and therefore the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The United States of America: Sea to Shining Sea

Protected by oceans on its east and west coasts and flanked by friendly nations to the north and south, the United States has lived in little fear of invasion from hostile foreign powers.

In the early years of our country's development, the geography of the United States kept the individual states and territories from having much to do with each other. The federal system of government that developed in the United States was designed to accommodate the diversity that existed among regions, with their widely varying needs and demands, while strengthening the national unity needed to establish the United States as a distinct political system. Throughout the nation's first century, the states' common interests were few, and thus the federal government remained small.

The states of America united slowly, taking 125 years for the forty-eight continental states to join together to become a single federal nation, and another forty-seven years for Alaska and Hawaii to become part of the Union.

Since 1959, the United States covers 3,615,122 square miles. Geographical barriers—such as mountains, rivers, dense forests, and wide deserts—are no longer a problem. Linked by extensive railway and highway systems, over five thousand cities with populations of more than five thousand provide homes for 73.7 percent of America's total population of more than 240 million people. The fifty states range in size from tiny Rhode Island (1,055 square miles) to gargantuan Alaska (570,833 square miles).



The United States is bordered by two friendly nations and two oceans.

Foreign countries seem remote to most people in the United States. To visit them usually involves traveling over great expanses of water for many hours. It is perhaps equally difficult for Americans to comprehend "foreign powers," as no foreign nation has occupied U.S. territory, brandishing its "power," for more than 200 years. Some people believe that the United States is not sufficiently aware of the *interdependence* of the nations of the world because of its relative isolation geographically. However, others feel that the United States has become too involved in foreign countries that are far from its borders and interests at home.

America's geographic isolation is somewhat modified because its population is a "melting pot" of nationalities that immigrated to the United States from all over the world. Different stages in U.S. history saw waves of immigration from particular areas. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many people from England and Western Europe came to America. In the nineteenth century immigrants from China and Ireland provided the labor to build America's transcontinental railroad. Groups frequently came to America to escape religious or political persecution or lack of economic opportunity in their own country. Recent waves of immigration have included refugees from Vietnam as well as Central Americans fleeing both political regimes and economic conditions.

Although the majority of immigrants exchange the language and traditions of their native culture for the language and culture of the United States, many remain interested in political events in their native country. Even the children of immigrants, who may never have visited their cultural homeland, feel a link with the country of their past. Thus, events in Ireland, Eastern Europe, Central America, China, Israel, and elsewhere hold added significance for U.S. citizens who trace their cultural roots to those areas. These citizens often form lobbying organizations to attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy.

The United States is fortunate to have a population that is both sufficiently "American" to provide a united front in foreign policy, yet diverse enough to provide different perspectives to makers of U.S. foreign policy.

The Soviet Union: An Expansive Motherland

The Soviet Union, in land mass, is the largest country in the world. Stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean, the U.S.S.R. incorporates 8,647,250 square miles—more than one-seventh of the earth's land surface. It is easier to compare the size of the Soviet Union with continents than with other countries. For example, the U.S.S.R. is smaller than Africa but larger than South America. It is three times larger than Australia.

Americans frequently call the Soviet Union "Russia," but that is incorrect. Since 1922, the Soviet Union has been a

federal system, composed of individual *union republics* that together form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Russia—officially called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)—is the largest of the republics. Russians consider their republic to be the "elder brother" of the fourteen other republics.

The fifteen union republics range in size from Armenia (11,506 square miles—somewhat larger than Maryland) to the Russian republic (6,593,391 square miles—over ten times the size of Alaska). Each of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics borders on a foreign country or on the Baltic Sea and has an ethnically homogeneous native population. No other nation in the world shares borders with as many different countries as does the Soviet Union. Being surrounded by so many, often hostile, foreign countries makes the Soviets extremely concerned about maintaining secure borders, safe from invasion.

The Soviet population is a mixture of a hundred different nationalities. Fifteen of the sixteen largest national groups have their own union republic. Although these republics now peacefully coexist within a united federal structure, some of them were bitter enemies for hundreds of years prior to imposition of Russian, and then Soviet, rule. While republics such as Moldavia historically had little opportunity to develop a unique national identity, others, like the Central Asian republics, remain fiercely loyal to political, religious, and cultural traditions that in some cases predate Russian civilization itself.

The Soviet regime would like for the various nationalities to become dedicated to the Soviet future rather than to their ethnic past. Soviet leaders have spoken of the need to create a Soviet "new man." Such citizens would speak fluent Russian (the official language of the Soviet Union), would be highly educated, would be willing to leave their native homelands to work elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and would not be bound by ethnic traditions. A nation of Soviet "new men" would result in a Soviet "melting pot," much like that of the United States. However, the Soviets are far from achieving this goal, and they remain plagued by the "nationalities problem." In the Soviet military, where all commands are given in Russian, many Central Asian recruits find it difficult to learn simple procedures because of their inability to understand the language.

Competing Economic Ideologies: Capitalism versus Communism

Americans and Soviets focus more on the difference between the economic systems of their nations than on any other factor. In fact, Americans often think of communism as a type of government rather than as a type of economic system.

One school of thought believes that a nation's economic principles determine its political, social, and cultural orientation. These people are called *economic determinists*. Karl Marx was an economic determinist because

Twelve nations, including the rival PRC, surround the Soviet Union.



How We Compare

	United States	Soviet Union
Total Population	240,000,000	280,000,000
Population Rank in World	Fourth	Third
Rural Population (Percent)	24	38
Urban Population (Percent)	76	62
Work Force Engaged in Agriculture (Percent)	3.4	20
Life Expectancy (in Years)	Male: 70 Female: 77.5	Male: 64 Female: 74
Literacy (Percent)	99	99
Leading Exports	Grain, machinery, high-technology equipment, chemicals, arms	Petroleum, iron, steel, lumber, machinery, arms
Leading Imports	Petroleum, natural gas, iron, steel, motor vehicles	High-technology equipment, grain

he believed that a fundamental change in a nation's economic structure (such as a change from capitalism to socialism) would bring with it a restructuring of that nation's society in all other spheres.

Although the Soviet Union's government is totalitarian, other nations have combined a socialist economy with different types of government. For instance, the economies of the Scandinavian countries are socialist, but their governments are democratic.

Many people today believe that pure socialism and pure capitalism do not exist. (Everyone agrees that no nation has successfully achieved a purely communist system.) In the Soviet Union, capitalist incentives have been introduced, such as farmers being allowed to work private plots for personal profit and factory workers being given merit raises for particularly productive work. Likewise, the United States has adopted certain socialist values, such as the responsibility of the government to provide medical care for the old (Medicare) and the poor (Medicaid). The U.S. government also subsidizes private enterprise by providing tax incentives for activities it wishes to encourage, such as exploration for energy reserves.

Although the economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union share some elements, their differences still remain paramount. The economic system of the Soviet Union was adopted consciously, initially by a small group of people, and implemented by a centralized leadership that succeeded (at great human cost) in pulling the economy of the Soviet Union from its still largely feudal state at the beginning of the twentieth century to that of a modern, industrial nation a mere sixty-five years later. On the other hand, the economy of the United States developed gradually, and individuals, not the government, were responsible for the shape of it.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are tied to the differences in their economies. Both nations believe their way to be superior. Both fear and denounce the abuses that the other's system seems to perpetrate on its citizens. Americans point to the lack of personal freedom allowed Soviet citizens as critically as Soviets point to the extreme poverty of many Americans living in the richest country in the world.

This section examines the development of communism and capitalism and helps to explain how far apart are the fundamental concepts underlying each.

Capitalism

After the fall of the Roman Empire, with its centralized government and highly developed civilization, the nations in the area that is now Western Europe and Russia were plunged into a period of chaos and violence. In response to the need to protect themselves from repeated invasions from the Vikings in the North and the Mongols in the East, these early Europeans developed a complex system of mutual protection that grew into the system of feudalism.

The feudal system was one in which the welfare of the community was all-important. The role of the church in feudal society was central. Most people were peasants who worked the land; their lives were structured rigidly by religious rites and by the needs of the land. Individual prosperity was not a goal for the peasants. Instead, they had a sense of being part of an organic community, of a universal Christian society that existed across the continent of Europe. In accordance with this view, prices charged for goods and services were regulated by a central religious authority interested in maintaining stability in the community, not in making the producers of the goods and services rich.

Such a system was not amenable to the development of capitalism, with its emphasis on economic self-interest. Before capitalism could flourish, civilization had to undergo change of great magnitude. And, over a period of seven hundred years, it did just that.

The major transformations that allowed capitalism to develop in Europe were:

1) emergence of the nation state;
2) scientific and industrial development;
3) development of Protestant sects within Christianity; and
4) secularization of the society.

These societal transformations began slowly at first, and then proceeded with accelerating speed. They became increasingly interconnected and supportive of each other. For instance, the Protestant Reformation broke the monolithic hold that the church had over people's lives. As different Protestant sects developed— challenging each other and the central religious hierarchy in Rome— two things happened: society began to develop a religious tolerance for differing sects, and the central authority of the church began to decrease. Both of these developments had a secularizing effect on society. Some scholars find the roots of capitalism in early Protestantism. They suggest that Protestantism—with its emphasis on the individual rather than on the group and, in some sects, the belief that economic prosperity is an indication of spiritual favor—

encouraged the capitalist concept of economic self-interest to grow.

As the central authority of the church diminished, kings and other secular leaders were able to secure greater power of their own. They increased their territory and their authority and started to take responsibility for establishing transportation networks, uniform systems of weights and money, and a uniform legal code. These developments in turn encouraged the growth of trade and the building of towns. The movement toward national unity began to replace the idea of a universal Christian European community. Although there was still some element of decentralized aristocratic control, the movement toward centralized governmental authority, in the person of a king or queen, became firmly established.

As an island separated from mainland Europe, England began to develop a national consciousness as early as the eleventh century. Over a period of several centuries, others followed suit. National borders tended to follow ethnic and linguistic divisions between people. In those areas where states came to encompass differing ethnic groups (like the Soviet Union), a sense of national unity has been somewhat harder to achieve.

A gradual separation of church and state became apparent. The long-buried concerns of the Roman Empire—science, art, literature, and philosophy—once again surfaced. Scientific discovery and industrial development became the marks of a new era, the Renaissance (meaning "rebirth"). As industry grew, so did the population of the towns, or urban areas. A pool of urban labor became available for the further development of industrial enterprise. An industrial middle and working class replaced the social classes of the aristocracy and the peasantry. The church no longer regulated prices and commerce. The role of the increasingly secular state in economic affairs was limited to the protection of the property rights of the growing class of capitalist entrepreneurs. Apart from that, the state was expected to keep its hands out of business. This concept was known as "laissez-faire capitalism." Economic decisions such as the level of prices and wages were to be set not according to the organic needs of the community as before, but rather with regard to the available supply of a particular commodity, including labor, and the demand for that commodity.

Scottish economist Adam Smith best described the theory of "laissez-faire capitalism" and the central role to be played by the "law" of supply and demand in his classic work, *The Wealth of Nations*. Published in 1776, *The Wealth of Nations* described not only the nature of capitalism but also the role of government in a capitalist economy. According to Smith, that role was to be extremely limited, or as summarized by Thomas Jefferson, "that government is best that governs least." The principles described by Smith were economic ideals that no society has achieved completely, but they were ideals that strongly influenced the early leaders of the United States and the development of the U.S. economy.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conversion of European society to secular government and a capitalist economic system was complete. In the United States, only recently freed from its colonial bonds to its "parent" England, the development of capitalism took on a special zeal. Having no aristocracy in the European sense and no entrenched religious establishment, the United States was a fertile ground for freewheeling capitalist enterprise. The existence of an expansive frontier and the continual arrival of industrious immigrants eager to succeed by exploiting the abundant resources of the new nation also contributed to the development of a society that valued personal productivity over inherited status. (The growth of the Horatio Alger myth in America—that the poorest farmer can become the wealthiest entrepreneur by the sheer power of hard work—is an outgrowth of this heritage.)

Throughout the 1800s, commercial enterprise remained relatively free of government interference. Toward the end of the century, however, various sectors of society began to call for government to step in to moderate some of the practices developed under the free enterprise system. Gradually, the government entered the field of regulation, first regulating such areas as interstate commerce, and later acting to protect minor children from ruthless exploitation as cheap labor.

Little by little, government increased its involvement in the economic sector. The principles of pure supply-and-demand capitalism were altered to meet the changing needs of capitalist nations. In the United States, for example, the government has taken on the role of economic regulator, controlling prices in certain industries, labor supply in others, passing regulations that impose costs on producers who in turn pass the costs on to consumers, and in many other ways disturbing Adam Smith's law of supply and demand.

Political factions have developed in the United States in response to the government's greater role in the economy. Some call for the government to reduce its role, allowing the laws of pure capitalism to work more freely. Others favor an even greater role for the government, particularly in providing services for which there is no economic profit, services traditionally ignored by private enterprise. It is likely that these factions will continue to argue, and the U.S. economy will continue to be a mix of capitalist enterprise and government regulation.

Communism

The basic concept behind communism is a very old one. Many early communities, from the ancient to those who settled in colonial America, governed themselves by the principle of a "common pot," into which everyone poured their labors and from which everyone drew their sustenance. Such communal systems worked with varying degrees of success.

Some of the problems that inevitably arose in the communal systems are among the current problems faced by

the Soviet Union. For instance, not everyone contributes equally to "the pot"; those who regularly contribute more begin to feel resentful when they receive the same rewards as those who contribute less. Even in systems that offer greater rewards for more productive work, problems arise because societies always place more value on some types of work than on others. For example, is it fair to pay bureaucrats twice the salary of construction workers? Construction workers might feel that bureaucrats sit in comfortable offices, shuffling papers and contributing little, while construction workers work in the hot sun all day to build housing for the society's citizens. But bureaucrats will claim that they take responsibility for the difficult decisions that must be made in governing the society. They maintain that they should be paid for taking such responsibility.

The communist concept—"from each according to ability, to each according to need"—might be a noble idea but extremely difficult to implement. Who is to determine how much each citizen needs? Many Americans feel that Soviet citizens are deprived because, as a rule, they do not have the luxuries enjoyed by many U.S. residents. But the Soviet leadership, and Soviet citizens themselves, may have very different ideas about the level of their needs and what they might legitimately expect from their "common pot."

Karl Marx was the most famous exponent of recent communist theory. Reacting to the extreme poverty of the urban masses in highly industrialized nations like England, he protested the capitalist system that took the labors of so many people and distributed the profits that resulted from those labors to so few people. Marx saw an inherent unfairness in the system.

According to Marx, such a system was doomed to destroy itself. He believed that a society would arise in its place in which the society as a whole would own all property. In this communal, or communist, system of ownership, the profits of the citizens' labors would be distributed among them, rather than to a few "overlords."

Marx predicted that the abused workers of industrialized cities would overthrow the capitalist system that he felt was oppressing them. The workers' uprising would be spontaneous and democratic in nature.

Marx did not anticipate that the workers would be able to establish a purely communist society immediately. Instead, he believed that the revolutionary state would have to pass through a period of socialism. During this socialist period, all property would belong to the people, but a state structure would exist to administer the property and wealth of the nation until the society evolved to the point where the state would no longer be necessary.

A young Russian lawyer, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), became a convert to Marxism in 1893. As Lenin continued to develop his thoughts about communism, socialism, and the need for revolution in Russia, he revised some of Marx's ideas in meaningful ways. While Marx and his followers originally had conceived the role of a Socialist party as being primarily one of educating the masses so that they could determine their own fate (presumably by demanding a socialist restructuring of society), Lenin saw the Socialist party as an elite that would provide direction to the masses. In place of the idea that the working masses would make decisions as a group, in a democratic manner, Lenin substituted the concept of a revolutionary elite that would determine political strategy and organize revolutionary activities. Although debate would be allowed among the elite before a decision was reached, once it had been decided, all members would be strictly bound by it, and all debate would end. The current role of the Communist party in the Soviet Union is much closer to Lenin's conception than to that of Marx.

Lenin adopted a second major revision in Marxist doctrine that came to characterize Russian socialism but was originally conceptualized by Leon Trotsky, another early Russian revolutionary. Marx had described a revolution that would occur in nations that had already passed through the capitalist stage and were therefore ripe for revolution to socialism, and later to communism. Trotsky developed the concept of "permanent revolution," which held that nations like Russia, which had not yet passed through the advanced stages of capitalism, could nonetheless provide the spark to world revolution. After the spark had been ignited in the more advanced capitalist nations, those countries would help the lesser developed Russia to maintain socialism successfully. Lenin did not actually accept Trotsky's idea until after the Russian Revolution had



Photo: Soviet Life from Sovfoto

Vladimir Illyich Lenin adopted the communist ideals of Karl Marx, but changed those principles to meet the needs of power politics in the Soviet Union.

successfully occurred. Then, needing an ideological rationale to justify the revolution philosophically, standard Bolshevik doctrine embraced the concept of "permanent revolution."

In applying Marxist doctrine to the fledgling Soviet Union, Lenin made many serious changes, including the development of a ruling Communist party that some charge is as dictatorial as its Czarist predecessor. However, Lenin maintained the essential optimism of Marx's belief that a socialist, and then communist, reordering of the world economic system would bring about a more humane world in which all people would be equal. Because Lenin believed the goals of establishing a socialist regime to be so worthy, he justified the violence and repression of individual liberties that accompanied the process. To some extent, the Soviets continue to justify the rigid discipline of the Communist party as a necessary means to a noble end, at which point the need for such strict control will cease to exist.

Since the early years of the Russian Revolution—when revolutionaries took philosophy very seriously, and seemingly minor ideological differences caused serious disputes within competing parties—Soviet leaders have altered socialist doctrine to meet the demands of Soviet society. Those who believe that socialist theory was meant to create an "open" system, capable of changing to fit the needs of different times and societies, see such change as necessary and practical. Others have charged Soviet leaders with "revisionism," accusing them of straying too far from Marx's original concepts.

Some of the recent reforms introduced have been aimed at addressing the Soviet Union's economic problems. Although the Soviets have a *command economy* (one in which all economic decisions have traditionally been made by the central authorities in the Kremlin), the regime has introduced a greater degree of decentralized decision making in recent years. In addition, the leadership, hoping to increase worker productivity, has permitted the institution of merit raises to reward the best workers. In the agricultural sector, many Soviets are now permitted to own private plots of land and to sell at a profit what they grow on those plots. These reforms, borrowed from the capitalist world, are not so drastic that they indicate a serious weakening of the socialist system in the Soviet Union. But whether or not the Soviet Union is moving toward pure communism remains in increasing doubt.

U.S. and Soviet Political Systems

A political system is a structure through which nations make both decisions and laws. Not all political decisions are translated into laws, but many of them are. Some societies, like those of the United States and the Soviet Union, have different types of laws. For instance, in the United States, laws passed by Congress are called statutory law; laws that result from court rulings are called common law; executive orders issued by the president are a third type of law; and other agencies of the executive

Photo: Novosti Press Agency

Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Communist Party, the most powerful position in the Soviet hierarchy.

branch may issue regulations that equally have the force of law. In the Soviet Union, the situation is much the same, with various organs of the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet government all having the authority to issue ordinances, decrees, or statutory laws.

Equally important as laws and regulations are the decisions made by political systems, decisions that reflect the society's values, or at least the values of a portion of the society. For instance, the allocation of resources—particularly money—in a society is extremely important. Will more or less money be spent on arms, social welfare, highways, housing, education, and medical research? These decisions guide a nation's development. They are principally the result of lengthy, often painful, decision-making processes, much of which goes on behind closed doors.

Both decision making and law making are a combination of formal and informal processes. Frequently, the formal decision to pass a piece of legislation or issue a regulation is the result of extensive informal lobbying by competing interest groups and by members of the political organizations themselves. In the Soviet Union, little debate occurs after a decision has been made; the passing of the law instituting the decision is a formality. But that should not lead those in the West to think that decisions in the Soviet Union are not debated heatedly for lengthy periods before they are finally resolved.

The "players" in the decision-making and law-making apparatuses in both countries are in some cases the same and in other cases different. Generally, the decision-mak-

ing structure draws on many more people than does the law-making system. Among those who play a role in the decision-making system are influential members of the media, lobbying organizations, and others whose opinions may be sought on an issue because of their expertise in that area.

Decisions and laws may be mutually complementary, or they may conflict with each other. In the United States, for instance, members of Congress may pass a law designed to render less effective (or, in their minds, "less damaging") an executive order passed by the president. Or an executive branch agency may refuse to request funds in its budget to implement a law passed by Congress. While a high level of disorder may exist in such a system, its citizens take pride in the degree of democracy that permits such active representation of opposing values. In the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Communist party makes the most important decisions. The laws passed by state and government leaders faithfully reflect those decisions. Soviet citizens take pride in the stability of their system. Their political history is not one of parliamentary debate; therefore, continuity of policy may be more important to Soviets than is active and open feuding among competing factions.

This section describes the political systems of both nations. A very great difference between the systems is that the Soviet economy is a command economy, one in which the Communist party and the government determine the level of prices, wages, and supply and production of goods and services. (In the United States, the marketplace generally controls those levels.) Therefore, the Soviet political system has the additional burden of running the economy. This responsibility is easier to meet when power is more centralized. (A small group makes a decision more easily than does a large group.) Yet some Soviet decision makers believe that more decisions need to be made at the local level. One of the greatest questions currently facing the Soviet political system is what level of decentralization in economic decision making to allow.

The U.S. System

In the United States, a constitution determines the formal decision-making structure. The U.S. Constitution established a system of government, with three parts, or branches. Each branch exercises a "check-and-balance" role toward the other two. The legislative branch makes the law, the executive branch enforces it, and the judicial branch interprets it.

Through two hundred years of interpretation and the need to respond to events that the authors of the Constitution could not possibly have foreseen, the powers and responsibilities of each of the three branches of the U.S.

Photo: National Archives

President Ronald Reagan addresses a joint session of Congress.

The Executive Branch



The Judicial Branch





government have changed considerably over time. However, to the credit of the Constitution's authors, the basic principle of each branch "checking" the power of the others, so that no one group could gain too much control, has remained intact.

Perhaps the branch that has changed most substantially is the executive branch. George Washington's first Cabinet had only four members: the secretaries of state, treasury, and war, and the attorney general. Now there are thirteen Cabinet departments, and each department has hundreds to thousands of employees. Likewise, an extensive office of the president, unknown in earlier times, has been created to help meet the increasing responsibilities of the president. The responsibilities of presidents now include conducting foreign policy, sending major legislative initiatives to Congress, serving as commander-in-chief of the military, acting as head of their political party, and creating law through executive fiat. Although presidents have extensive powers, they still have to play the role of the lobbyist in trying to influence members of Congress and the public in order to have their policies successfully implemented. Presidents "check" the power of the other two branches by vetoing legislation passed by Congress, by invoking executive privilege to withhold information from Congress and the courts, and by making appointments to the Supreme Court.

The legislative branch of the U.S. government is a bicameral body composed of the House of Representatives, whose membership is based on each state's population, and the Senate, whose membership is evenly divided among the states. All legislation concerning financial appropriations originates in the House. Both houses have a system of committees and subcommittees that hold hearings on legislative proposals before sending them to the full membership of each house for a vote.

The degree to which the U.S. Congress becomes involved in making decisions about foreign policy has varied over the years. During the 1970s, Congress reasserted its foreign policy authority, partially in response to its perception that the executive branch had led the country into a disastrous conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. In 1974, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which prohibits the president from committing U.S. troops for more than ninety days without the consent of Congress. The Senate also has the power to ratify treaties and approve the appointment of ambassadors and other key national security personnel. In recent years, conflict between the executive branch and Congress developed over Senate opposition to the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter and over several of President Ronald Reagan's appointments to key arms control negotiating positions.

The federal legal system in the United States is headed by the nine-member Supreme Court whose members are appointed by the president and confirmed by Congress (thereby giving each of the other two branches some "checking" authority). Of the thousands of requests that the Supreme Court receives yearly from citizens eager to argue their cases before the highest court, it can schedule only a small fraction.

In its role as interpreter of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises a certain power over the legislative branch. Laws passed by Congress have at times been challenged as unconstitutional and ruled invalid by the High Court.

Although the Supreme Court generally does not play a large role in foreign policy, on occasion it has challenged the constitutionality of foreign policy actions taken by a president or by Congress. However, its authority in this area has been limited by its inability to enforce its decisions.

The Soviet System

The Soviet political system, which is different from the American system, is often called a *party-state*. The Soviet system is composed of two separate structures: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the state bureaucracy. These two structures work together to plan and carry out the decisions necessary to run the country. The Communist party provides the general direction for Soviet society—economic, political, and military—and the Soviet bureaucracy (or the government) executes the policies. The organization of each structure is discussed below.

The Communist Party

At the top of the Communist party hierarchy is the Central Committee; at the bottom are approximately four hundred thousand primary organizations located in all types of local organizations and workplaces. In between the top and bottom of the hierarchy, thousands of Party professionals help to determine and carry out the policies that guide the Soviet Union.

The Communist party continues to operate by the principle of centralized decision making established by Lenin. According to the Soviet press agency, *Novosti*, "Centralism means discipline and unity. The decisions and directives of higher Party bodies are binding on the lower Party organizations; the minority must submit to the decision of the majority." Under Party rules, all Party members have a right to criticize and to express their opinion on any question. Once a decision is adopted, however, it is binding on all Party members.

According to the Soviet Constitution, the Party's "supreme organ" is the Party Congress that is convened "at least once every five years." However, because of the infrequency of its meetings and its large size (over five thousand delegates attended the 1986 Party Congress), the ability of the Congress to conduct substantive debates and decision making is severely limited.

Between Party Congresses, the Central Committee directs all Party activities. Membership of the Central Committee has expanded over the years, from three members in 1898 to its current membership of 318. In addition to voting members, the Central Committee currently has 150 candidate members, who may join in debate about issues but not vote. The Central Committee conducts its business during a series of plenary sessions. Again, because of its size, such meetings are necessarily limited.

The Structure of the Soviet Leadership

Communist Party Hierarchy



Politburo Members
(as of March 1986)

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party
Geidar Aliyev, First Deputy Premier
Viktor Chebrikov, KGB Chief
Andrei Gromyko, President
Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Kazakhstan Chief
Yegor Ligachev, Chief of Ideology
Nikolai Ryzhkov, Premier
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Ukraine Party Chief
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Mikhail Solomentsev, Party Control
Vitaly Vorotnikov, Premier of Russian Republic
Lev Zaikov, Central Committee Secretary

The Soviet Government Hierarchy


The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet of the Union: 750 deputies
The Soviet of Nationalities: 750 deputies
The Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and Four Vice-Chairmen
The Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and Four Vice-Chairmen
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
Standing Commissions of the Soviet of the Union
Standing Commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities
The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
The Committee of People's Control of the U.S.S.R.
The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
The Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R.

The Central Committee therefore elects a political bureau, the Politburo, to direct Party activity between its meetings.

It is the decisions of the Politburo that Americans hear about most frequently. Membership in the Politburo is highly political, and the number of regular and candidate members may fluctuate. Usually there are about eleven or twelve full members and six to nine candidate members. The Politburo membership includes the highest ranking Soviet officials. Soviet expert John Reshetar describes the working of the Politburo as follows:

> Central Committee resolutions usually reflect Politburo decisions, and the Politburo also issues directives to various government ministries and agencies. It takes up urgent problems brought before it by the departments of the Party Secretariat, by a ministry, or by the Council of Ministers. Individual Politburo members often have a field of specialization for which they are responsible, deciding matters of lesser import independently and referring difficult cases to the entire Politburo. On occasion, the Politburo has discussed matters that would appear to be trivial in other regimes. When the Politburo has not been able to resolve internal conflicts involving a struggle for power, those conflicts have been taken to the Central Committee. The presence of a dominant personality, such as Lenin or Stalin...has determined the way in which the Politburo would function and has restricted its freedom of action. In the absence of such a dictator, arbiter, or strong personality, decisions have been arrived at "collectively" with more deliberation and less dispatch. In addition to the Politburo, the Central Committee elects a secretariat. The secretariat directs the party's vast administrative apparatus. It oversees the appointment of Communist party cadres, directs the Party's daily activities, and ensures that the Party's policy directives are being carried out. The secretariat has varied in size, from three to fourteen members.

The State Bureaucracy: The Supreme Soviet

The Soviet Constitution refers to the Supreme Soviet as the "highest organ of state power in the U.S.S.R." Western analysts frequently have referred to it as a mere "rubber stamp," whose sole function is to approve routine Communist party decisions. The truth lies somewhere in between.

The Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The chambers have an equal number of representatives, equal powers to initiate legislation, are organized in the same manner, and employ identical procedures. The only difference between the two chambers is that the Soviet of the Union addresses issues of universal concern, while the Soviet of the Nationalities is responsible for issues that apply to specific national groups.

The Supreme Soviet meets for several days each year. Its "legislators" are not professional politicians but people with regular jobs who take leave to attend the sessions, much like representatives to state legislatures in the United States. The reason that many in the West feel that the Supreme Soviet merely rubber-stamps Party decisions is because of the shortness of the sessions, the fact that

voting is done by a show of hands only, and because all votes are unanimous.

Since the Soviet Union has become an increasingly industrial nation with more and more complex economic problems to resolve, the Supreme Soviet has taken on greater significance. Just as the "real" work of the U.S. Congress is done by its committees and subcommittees, so the Supreme Soviet has a number of commissions and subcommissions that hold hearings and otherwise gather expert testimony on complex issues being considered by the state. Just as in democracies, information is power because decisions are made based on the information presented to the decision makers, so in the Soviet Union, difficult economic choices are influenced greatly by the information presented to decision makers. The commissions of the Supreme Soviet furnish just such information.

Another way in which the Supreme Soviet performs a typically legislative function is that some ministers (although not a great many) are allowed to bring to the attention of the group the particular economic interests of their constituencies. The sessions of the ministers are also occasions on which the regime may criticize individual ministries for inadequate production. In other ways as well, the regime uses the Supreme Soviet as a sounding board to disseminate both foreign and domestic policy decisions.

Just as the Politburo directs daily Communist party activity between meetings of the Central Committee and Party Congresses, so the Supreme Soviet elects a presidium to direct daily legislative activities. The Presidium consists of a chairman, a first vice-chairman, fifteen vice-chairmen (one from each Union Republic), a secretary, and twenty-one members. Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist party, also acts as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The responsibilities of the Presidium are extremely varied, from supervising the legislative work of the commissions to supervising the military (although the most important decisions are made by the Party) and exercising certain legal functions, such as granting pardons and amnesties. The Presidium also monitors public opinion by referring citizen letters, complaints, and appeals to the appropriate agency.

The State Bureaucracy: The Council of Ministers

If the Supreme Soviet ("the state") is somewhat akin to a legislative branch, the Council of Ministers acts like an executive branch. (The Soviets consider the Council of Ministers more generally as "the government.") The chairman of the Council of Ministers is the "premier" or "president" of the nation; but in fact, that person is not necessarily the most powerful political figure in the Soviet decision-making hierarchy. When Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev had reached their most powerful as general secretary of the Communist party, they chose to assume the position of premier as well. However, Leonid Brezhnev never assumed the title but was clearly the most powerful individual in the Soviet hierarchy in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.

Just as the executive branch in the United States can make law by issuing regulations—usually based on laws passed by Congress—so the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union issues ordinances said to be based on laws passed by the Supreme Soviet. There are two types of ordinances: those that establish general policy and those that implement specific policies. The first reflect value judgments made by the Communist party and are issued by the Council as a group; the second are more technically oriented and are signed only by the chairman or a deputy.

The relationship between the Communist party and the Soviet government is complex. Many overlapping players exist in the different hierarchies. For example, a substantial majority of the Presidium's members are members or candidate members of the Party Central Committee. While this dual role ensures that Party positions are reflected effectively in state policies, it also means that the positions of state officials become known to the most powerful Party members and inevitably affect the decision-making process.

The Soviet decision-making and law-making apparatuses have changed over the years. In the Stalin years, leaders were purged when Stalin felt they had gained enough authority to pose a challenge. During Khrushchev's regime, insecurity in the ranks continued as the general secretary conducted business in an arbitrary, frequently contradictory way. One of Gorbachev's goals is to bring a sense of stability and professionalism to the leadership. By all signs, he has achieved a large measure of success. One indication of that success was the smooth way in which the transition of power was made after the death of Konstantin Chernenko in 1985.

Summary

■ A nation's foreign policy is influenced by geopolitical factors such as its location, population, resource needs, and political system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are industrial, largely urban societies with a wealth of natural resources. Because the Soviet Union borders twelve foreign countries, it is particularly concerned with security. Although the United States historically has been protected geographically, it has developed economic interests in many parts of the world, which it feels a strong commitment to protect.

■ The U.S. population is a "melting pot" of nationalities who have come from around the world seeking political and religious freedom and economic betterment. Although some immigrants maintain the language and cultural traditions of their native land, most become "Americanized" rather quickly.

The Soviet population is composed of many different nationalities, most of whom speak different native languages and remain committed to their cultural pasts. Soviet leaders would like there to be a Soviet "melting pot," which would produce citizens more committed to the Soviet future than to their cultural past.

■ A major difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is their economic systems. The economy of the United States, although not purely capitalist, is largely based on the principles of capitalism. Those principles include: private ownership of property, the law of supply and demand, and the limitation of government's role in the economy. The Soviet Union has a socialist economy, which may or may not evolve into a communist economy. In a communist economy, the society as a whole owns property, there is no need for a government, and everyone contributes based on their ability, taking what they need to live. In a socialist economy, the government administers the communally owned property on behalf of the people. In the Soviet Union, the Communist party and the Soviet state and government play a central role in directing the economy.

■ The United States has a tripartite, or three-sided, government: an executive branch, a legislative branch, and a judicial branch. The legislative branch passes laws to govern U.S. society; the executive branch enforces those laws; and the judicial branch interprets the laws and makes judgments about whether or not laws have been broken.

■ The three branches of the U.S. government exercise a "checks-and-balances" function with respect to each other so that no one branch can assume too much unquestioned power. The executive branch has the principal responsibility for foreign policy, particularly the president, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. In the past decade, however, Congress has taken a more active role in determining foreign policy.

■ The Soviet Union's political system is divided into three parts: the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet government. The Communist party provides the leadership and direction of Soviet society. In organization, the Soviet state is roughly equivalent to the U.S. legislative branch, and the Soviet government is comparable to the U.S. executive branch. Although it is clear that the Communist party is by far the most powerful of the three, both the Soviet state and the Soviet government play an active role in running the very large and highly complex Soviet nation.

Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations

IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

As you read this section, try to answer the following questions. In some cases, there is more than one way to look at things. Stretch your imagination, and try to see events as a Soviet citizen or as an American citizen in another time might have.

- Was the United States or the Soviet Union more to blame for the conditions under which their relationship began? Were they equally responsible?
- Should the United States have given diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union before 1933 even though the United States opposed Soviet policies?
- Is it easier to cooperate with an opponent if you are both fighting a common enemy? If so, why?
- Why did the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union break down immediately after World War II?
- How does a "cold war" differ from a "hot" or "shooting war"?
- Why did the United States feel threatened when the Soviets placed missiles and bombers in Cuba? If the Soviets had not removed the missiles, should the United States have gone to war over the issue?
- Why are arms control agreements important?
- What did the United States hope to gain from detente? What did the Soviet Union hope to gain? Were these expectations realistic?
- Why did detente break down? Was it inevitable that it would not last?
- How do world events affect U.S.-Soviet relations?

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States and the Soviet Union have assumed the worst about each other's intentions. Although attempts have been made in the last seventy years to ease tensions, the two nations have continued to mistrust each other. Their perceptions of one another have affected profoundly the nature of their relationship.

Off to a Bad Start: 1914-1920

The First World War broke out in Europe in 1914. On one side, known as "the Entente," were Britain, France, and Russia, on the other, Germany and Austria. The West deemed Russia's participation in the war as crucial because it presented an eastern front that diverted approximately 130 German divisions from other battlefields. As the war drew on, however, massive losses and widespread famine caused the Russian people to lose confidence in their emperor, Czar Nicholas II. In March 1917, food riots broke out in the city of Petrograd (now Leningrad). When even the conservative political factions, including the army generals, refused to support the emperor, he was forced to abdicate his throne. The Russian people, long used to authoritarian, monarchic rule, were left without a head of state. For a time, a provisional government was established, headed by a liberal member of the aristocracy, Prince Lvov. However, factional disputes remained intense, the suffering caused by the war continued, and no single group seemed able to control the chaos.

The Western powers, including the United States, supported the new regime and quickly gave it diplomatic recognition. However, they were unable to provide the economic assistance desperately needed by the war-ravaged Russian economy. By the time U.S. troops entered the war on the side of the Entente, many Russians were calling for an end to Russian participation in the war. One of these groups was the Bolsheviks, led by the charismatic leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks led a successful coup against the provisional government. In the West, this has become known as the Russian Revolution. For the next three years, violence gripped the country as the Bolsheviks consolidated their hold on the government, fighting rival groups both from within their own party and from groups that wanted a return to aristocratic rule.

On November 8, 1917, the new *Soviet* government issued what might be considered its first foreign policy statement. The statement, entitled "Decree on Peace," called for an immediate peace without annexation (that is, without one power seizing the land of another). The new Soviet leaders addressed their appeal not only to the governments of the warring nations but also to the "class-

conscious workers" of those nations. Their message to the workers was that the interests of working class people were a common tie that went beyond the bond of national identity. This was to be a much repeated theme of the Bolsheviks, one that would cause great anxiety among leaders of Western governments, who recognized that their legitimacy was based on their peoples' commitment to a national identity and not to an identity based on economic class.

On March 3, 1918, the new Soviet regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, withdrawing from the war and ceding much of its territory to its former enemy. The Germans, with more than one hundred divisions newly freed, launched a devastating offensive on the Western front. In June, the United States began sending troops to northern and northeastern Russia in an effort to draw German resources from the embattled Western front.

World War I ended on November 11, 1918, but violence continued to rage within the fledgling Soviet state. Supporters of the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet state (the "Reds") and those who opposed them (the "Whites") were fighting a civil war. Among those who opposed the Bolsheviks were at least eighteen rival "governments" as well as roving bands of Imperial Army troops and members of the former aristocracy.

At the end of the summer of 1918, U.S. forces already positioned in Russia began supporting various "White Russian" groups. The Soviets have always cited this support as an attempt to "strangle Bolshevism in its cradle." American opposition to the Bolsheviks dashed Lenin's earlier hopes that active trade relations could be established between the United States and Soviet Russia.

By 1921, the Bolshevik faction had secured incontestable authority over the country. The United States and the other major Western powers refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government, demanding that it first repay international debts incurred by the Czar's regime. Thus, U.S.-Soviet relations began under a cloud.

The World Rebuilds, Then Returns to War: 1922-1945

Throughout the 1920s, both the United States and the Soviet Union turned their attention inward, laboring to rebuild their war-torn economies. Until Lenin's death in 1924, he continued to secure his hold over the Communist party and to expand the authority of the new Soviet government in political, economic, and geographic scope. Under Lenin's successor, Josef Stalin, programs designed to convert the largely agrarian Soviet economy to a more industrialized society dedicated to socialist principles continued. During this period, the U.S.S.R. viewed Great Britain, and not the United States, as its principal antagonist in the West. The Soviets sought from America transfers of technology and the sale of industrial machinery. The fact that the United States did not block such activities indicates that it did not yet view the Soviet Union as a serious threat to its own security. However, the United States did continue to deny diplomatic recognition to Lenin's, and then Stalin's, government. When the United States finally established formal relations in November 1933, it was the last Great Power to do so.

The 1930s brought worldwide depression. In America, millions were jobless and homeless. In an effort to protect their industries, nations passed restrictive tariff laws, which all but ended world trade, encouraging nations to become politically isolationist. The repressions of the Nazi party were growing in Germany, but the world seemed not to notice. The Soviet Union was achieving rapid industrialization, but at great hardship to laborers forced to live with many restrictions on their freedom. Stalin was a ruthless leader. Reports of bloody purges designed to eliminate competing centers of power and of cruel mass deportations of ethnic minorities to achieve forced collectivization of agriculture reached the West and disappointed many who had held high hopes for the "workers' state."

On August 23, 1939, Stalin entered into a nonaggression treaty with Adolf Hitler, Nazi dictator of Germany. (The treaty, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed officially on September 28, 1939.) Stalin later maintained that he had had no choice, that the pact had been made "at the point of a gun." The Nazi-Soviet alliance remained in shaky semblance until June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. On July 13, 1941, the Soviet Union and Britain signed a mutual aid agreement. U.S. entrance into the war on December 7 of that year marked the beginning of the Grand Alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Although the allied effort was not without disharmony, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained good throughout the war. The people of both nations were making valiant efforts to defeat German fascism. The Soviets eventually lost 20 million people to the cause.

One War Ends and a "Cold War" Begins: 1945-1947

In February 1945, when the defeat of Germany and its allies was imminent, the leaders of the Grand Alliance met in Yalta, a resort town in the Soviet Union, to plan for the future of Europe. Britain succeeded in restoring a stable political order in Western Europe by insisting on the restoration of French military and political power. The United States sowed the seeds of what was to become its thirty-eight-year presence in Western Europe. Germany and its capital, Berlin, were divided into zones to be occupied by each of the Grand Alliance members and by France. The Soviets succeeded in gaining control of the Kurile Islands in the Pacific Ocean, a Russian goal that predated the 1917 revolution. With the Soviet army firmly entrenched in Eastern Europe, a large part of the huge German empire went to Soviet control. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was established.

After Yalta, a new world order emerged. For the first time for either country, the United States and the Soviet Union

Photo Library of Congress

Leaders of the Grand Alliance—Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin—met at Yalta in 1945 to discuss the geographic boundaries of post-World War II Europe.

were undisputed world powers. Neither country had the foreign policy experience or a foreign policy bureaucracy in place to cope readily with its sudden international superpower status.

The cooperative efforts of the Grand Alliance faded even before the formal end of the war. Conflict developed over Soviet domination of the Polish government in violation of the Yalta accords. The Soviets similarly felt threatened by the separate talks being held by the Americans and the British with their recent enemy, the Germans. President Franklin Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, further jeopardized the fragile alliance that had been so dependent on personal diplomacy. The Soviets were well aware that the new American president, Harry Truman, felt greater hostility toward the Soviet regime than had his predecessor. Thus, even before the United States ended its war with Japan, it had entered a new type of war with its former ally, a "cold war."

The Birth of Bipolar Politics: 1947-1955

On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman went before a joint session of Congress and asked that the United States grant aid to the nations of Greece and Turkey to fight the spread of communism there. In his speech, he described "the communist way of life" as "the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority." This policy of attempting to contain the spread of communism by granting aid to governments challenged by communist factions became known as the Truman Doctrine. Soviet expert Adam Ulam describes the impact of Truman's rhetoric on U.S. foreign policy:

> The speech could hardly have unduly ruffled the Soviet leaders' feelings. In the years since 1945, their own language in reference to the United States and Britain had hardly been more complimentary. But it was a startling departure from wartime oratory. Truman could not go into the hopeless complexities of the world crisis; instead, that crisis was dramatized as a contest between two ways of life, the communist one spreading in "the evil soil of poverty and strife" and the democratic one "based upon the will of the majority...." Just as during the war alliance with Stalin's Russia had been justified by presenting that country as a virtual democracy, so now the policy of containing Soviet expansion was presented as a struggle between light and darkness. In both instances the departure from political realism was to have a debilitating effect on American foreign policy.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to chill. On April 1, 1948, the Soviet Union began a land blockade of the portions of Germany's

What Is a "Cold War"?

According to political analyst William Safire, the term "cold war" was coined by Herbert Bayard Swope in a speech he wrote for politician Bernard Baruch. In an April 1947 speech, Baruch used the term to describe the atmosphere of warlike tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that existed without the actual presence of military hostilities. Newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann picked up the phrase and made it famous in his columns.

Safire writes that the phrase "gained international currency when [Soviet] Deputy Premier Nikolai Bulganin used it in his opening speech at the Big Four Conference in Geneva on July 18, 1955. Bulganin spoke of the Soviet 'desire for a settlement of the outstanding international problems and for the termination of the Cold War.'"

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American and Soviet citizens grew accustomed to the fact that their countries were "at war" with each other without actually being engaged in military battle. The weapons used by the United States and the Soviet Union to fight the Cold War were:

- propaganda, aimed at their own populations and at the populations of foreign nations;
- development of increasingly intimidating nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals;
- covert operations by their intelligence services;
- foreign and military aid designed to win friends among the nations not strictly aligned with either side; and
- political battles within the United Nations to gain international support for competing positions.

Just as truces may be declared in "hot" or "shooting" wars, so the United States and the Soviet Union seem to declare a truce in their cold war from time to time. An example of a truce in the Cold War was the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) treaty in 1972.

Photo UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

President Harry Truman described communism as "the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority."

divided capital, Berlin, that were occupied by Western forces. The Western powers responded with a counter-blockade and with the airlifting of 2,343,315 tons of food and coal into the city. The crisis continued for more than a year until, on September 30, 1949, both blockades were lifted. By that time, irreparable harm had been done to U.S.-Soviet relations.

In the midst of the Berlin blockade, the United States and Britain led the creation of a military alliance among West European powers and themselves, which was designed to provide a strong front against what they believed was a Soviet Red Army capable of sweeping through Europe. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. Its members agreed to support each other militarily in the event of an attack against any of them. The initial NATO members were Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined; in 1955, West Germany became the fifteenth member. (In 1982, Spain joined the NATO alliance.)

Scholars disagree about the Soviet reaction to the formation of NATO. Some believe Stalin saw the alliance as an ominous threat to the Soviet Union; those scholars see particular significance in the fact that the Soviets



successfully tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. Others believe that the Soviets did not really fear NATO until West Germany joined in 1955, pointing out that not until West Germany had become part of the alliance did the Soviet Union feel compelled to create a counteralliance, the Warsaw Pact. That alliance was composed of eight East European nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. (In 1968, Albania left the Pact.)

Adding to the postwar tensions in the West was the news that the four-year battle between nationalists and communists in China had ended in victory for the Chinese Communist party. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was established. The ruling communist faction immediately allied itself with the Soviet Union, which had supported it throughout its war with the nationalists (who had been supported by the United States). Although China could provide little economic support to the communist "world," the psychological effect of China's immense population "going communist" added to increasing Western fears of communist world domination.

By 1955, the world was divided politically in two: those within the Western (i.e. American) sphere of influence and those within the Soviet sphere. Soviet expert Thomas Larson describes the American outlook that distinguished between communist totalitarianism, which was considered wholly evil, and other totalitarian governments, which were not considered as repressive as long as they remained allied with the West:

> If postwar totalitarian theory sought to link the extinct Nazi and Fascist states with existing Communist states, it simultaneously sought to differentiate [Communist states] from "merely" authoritarian regimes. A deep divide was posited between Communist states and all others. The former were assigned to the category of "totalitarian" governments, the latter—whether democratic or dictatorial—to the category "free world." In this dichotomy freedom came to mean nothing more or less than freedom from Communist rule.

The Height of the Cold War: The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted only seven days. Yet when it was over, it had changed relations between the two major powers on earth in a significant way. Having ventured to the brink of nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union scared themselves into entering a new era in bilateral relations, the era of arms control negotiations.

The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis in some ways began more than 150 years ago when President James Monroe proclaimed the U.S. foreign policy that came to bear his name. The Monroe Doctrine held that "the American continents...by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." The doctrine was aimed at major European colonial powers, particularly Spain, France, and Russia. The United States feared that Spain might try to win back its newly freed colonies in South America and

Photo: UPI/Bettman Newsphotos

President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev at a 1961 summit conference. One year later they were locked in a battle of wills over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Central America and that the other European powers might aid Spain in doing so. In declaring its interest in the maintenance of a free and sovereign Western Hemisphere, the United States sent a "hands-off" message to the rest of the world. Since that time, when foreign powers have attempted to gain political or military control of any country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has cited the Monroe Doctrine as the basis for its own intervention in opposition to those forces. Although the United States had limited economic and political interests in South America and Central America when Monroe originally proclaimed the policy, since that time, the United States has developed extensive interdependent ties with those nations that make its commitment to their freedom from outside domination even more important.

The tiny country of Cuba, ninety miles off the shore of Florida, is one of the nations "covered" by the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout most of the 1950s, a corrupt and harsh dictator, Fulgencio Batista, ruled Cuba. In January 1959, Batista was overthrown by a young revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. The United States opposed the new regime because some of its leaders were socialist and refused economic assistance to Cuba. Castro then turned to the Soviet Union, which eagerly sought to bring Cuba into its political orbit. Under Castro, many reforms were initiated; however, the harsh repression of individual liberties characteristic of the Batista regime continued

under the Castro regime. Many Cubans who opposed the socialist policies of Castro's government fled to the United States. Some of them vowed to return to "liberate" Cuba from Castro's control. Many paramilitary groups formed in the Miami, Florida, area, where most of the Cuban immigrants lived. Some of these groups received training and other assistance from agencies of the U.S. government. In April 1961, about fourteen hundred Cubans attempted an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The attempt failed. In the process, hostility between the United States and Cuba reached a new height, and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States became extremely strained. Cuba became firmly entrenched in the socialist camp, and the Soviet Union achieved an unprecedented "toehold" in the Western Hemisphere.

In October 1962, U.S. reconnaissance planes photographed evidence of the installation of Soviet missiles and bombers in Cuba. The reaction of U.S. President John Kennedy was immediate and strong. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba and publicly demanded that the Soviets remove all the weapons at once. He implied that the United States was prepared to wage war if they were not removed. After several extraordinarily tense days, the Soviets agreed to remove the weapons.

The Age of Negotiation: 1963-1969

The 1960s were tumultuous years for both the United States and the Soviet Union and for the rest of the world. In the Soviet Union, a triumvirate of leaders—Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny, and Alexei Kosygin—replaced Nikita Khrushchev. They had much to accomplish. Khrushchev's policies had split the Communist party badly and virtually destroyed morale in the military services. His diplomatic defeat in the Cuban Missile Crisis was a source of international embarrassment to the Soviets.

In the United States, domestic dissent was brewing. The civil rights movement with its charismatic leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., succeeded in ending the century-old segregation that had divided black and white America. But the effort met opposition, often violent, in many corners. The civil rights banner, originally taken up by blacks, began to be waved by groups of women as well, demanding an end to their status as "second-class citizens." As the decade progressed, student opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam spread to "middle America," and the peace movement became a national grassroots cause.

Meanwhile, throughout the world, nations that had been part of Europe's colonial empire began to assert their independence. In the 1960s, the United Nations admitted forty-three new members to its ranks. Newly established nationalist regimes, often authoritarian, realized that they could play the U.S.-Soviet competition to their advantage. These largely nondeveloped nations became known as the "Third World." (The United States and its allies were dubbed the "First World," and the Soviet Union and its allies, the "Second World.") Political and economic competition for Third World loyalties began to play an increasing role in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

U.S. and Soviet leaders began to realize that, as major world powers in possession of rapidly growing and highly destructive weapons arsenals, they had a responsibility to try to reach some agreement to control the spiraling arms race. Their willingness to negotiate was also motivated by a growing appreciation that, as stable industrial world powers, they shared certain mutual interests, such as a desire to keep the spread of nuclear weapons from unstable, unpredictable regimes throughout the world. Finally, leaders of both nations faced populations that were demanding increased government spending in nonmilitary sectors of society. Agreement to control the growth of weapons development meant that both nations could devote a larger portion of their budgets to the growth of the consumer economy (in the Soviet Union) and to educational and social welfare programs (in the United States).

Among the arms control agreements signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s were the following:

The "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963—This established a direct communications link between Washington, D.C., and Moscow in an attempt to lessen the danger of a war breaking out from error or misunderstanding. It was modernized to include satellite communication in 1971.

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963—This agreement banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Underground nuclear explosions also were prohibited if they produced radioactive debris outside the nation conducting the test. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, 106 other nations have signed the treaty; fifteen others have signed but not ratified it.

Outer Space Treaty, 1967—This accord prohibited the installation of military facilities or weapons on celestial bodies, as well as the placing in orbit of any objects carrying nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, seventy-one countries have signed this treaty; sixty-eight others have ratified it or acceded to its terms.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with Protocols I and II, 1968—An extension of an earlier treaty signed by the United States but not by the U.S.S.R., this agreement makes Latin America a nuclear-free zone. Twenty-two countries have signed the agreement, which has been ratified or acceded to by another nineteen.

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968—One of the decade's most important accords, this treaty forbade states that possess nuclear weapons to transfer nuclear explosives to any nonnuclear-weapon state. Each state not in possession of nuclear weapons agreed not to acquire explosives on its own. More than 100 nations have either ratified or acceded to the treaty.

A Thaw in the Cold War—Detente: 1972-1979

Many factors contributed to the relaxation of tensions, or detente, between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

The First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), begun in 1969, produced the most comprehensive arms control agreement thus far. When President Richard Nixon traveled to Moscow in May 1972 to sign the treaty, he became the first U.S. president to visit the Soviet capital officially. The event was of great symbolic importance to the developing U.S.-Soviet relationship, bringing with it a return to the personal diplomacy that had not characterized U.S.-Soviet relations since World War II.

What Is Arms Control?

(Reprinted from ARMS CONTROL, Moving Toward World Security, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., July 1975)

In the nuclear age, arms control is a way of looking at national security to fit the fact that we can no longer assure the physical protection of our country. Trying to build forces that outstrip adversaries on the one hand, or simply getting rid of one's weapons on the other, will not make war disappear; either may invite war.

Arms control may include arms reduction, but it includes much more. It does not assume that arms, by themselves, cause war; but it seeks to size and structure military forces so as to make their use less likely. A nation may pursue this goal through unilateral actions or tacit or formal agreements. One of the objectives of [arms control negotiations] is to reach agreements between the two superpowers that will ensure that their strategic nuclear forces will be used for deterrence only and never for war.

Arms control also means efforts to make war less likely by restraining the spread of arms to new areas, as in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of 1968, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971.

Arms control means measures to limit the destructiveness of wars that may be fought, despite all efforts to prevent them. A case in point is the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, outlawing the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons. Another example is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an agreement that prohibits the use of poison gas in warfare.

Arms control may mean limiting the development or deployment of new types of weapons that would increase the risks of war, as in the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty of 1972—with its limitations on new technical developments—and the 1974 Vladivostok understanding to limit the number of U.S. and Soviet missiles that can carry multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Arms control may inhibit weapon testing, as in the Limited [nuclear] Test Ban Treaty of 1963; on the other hand, it may favor some advances in weapons technology, such as those that make missiles less prone to accidental launching and less vulnerable to surprise attack, because these advances would make for a more stable deterrent force.

Arms control may include disarmament steps that reduce military forces in a balanced and coordinated manner, so that at no time in the process would an adversary be tempted to take advantage through new offensive actions. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Europe provide an example.

Arms control means creating new opportunities for opposing sides to understand each other more fully at tense moments and to lessen the chance of accidental war or war that might arise from misunderstanding in time of crisis. The "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963 was such a step.

Arms control means finding ways to prevent the spread of deadly nuclear weapons to more nations, while still permitting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms control means efforts that nations may make on their own or by unwritten, tacit agreement. These may be just as important as signed treaties and executive agreements. What matters is the impact of a given measure in decreasing the likelihood of war and decreasing its destructiveness should it, despite all our efforts, occur.

The signing of the SALT I treaty in May 1972 marked the beginning of detente and a new era in arms control.



Photo: National Archives

Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security affairs advisor and later secretary of state, was a historian who had chronicled the European empire building of the nineteenth century. Kissinger believed that world peace would have a better chance if the nations of the world, including the United States and the Soviet Union, would increase their economic interdependence and thus their stake in maintaining stable world relations.

In addition, the continually shifting loyalties of newly independent Third World nations made U.S. leaders realize that every country that was anti-American was not necessarily pro-Soviet, and that even those countries that courted the Soviet brand of socialism would not necessarily remain in that camp for long. This realization brought with it a more realistic view of Soviet influence abroad and lessened American fears of a worldwide communist takeover.

Another factor in the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers was the experience of the Vietnam War, which caused many Americans to return to a sense of international isolationism and which resulted in demands for military budget cuts. This attitude was conducive to the establishment of a "live and let live" philosophy toward the Soviets. In 1972, only 39 percent of Americans polled by Potomac Associates believed that the United States should maintain a "number one" position in the world at all costs, including war.

In the Soviet Union, citizens were demanding more and better consumer goods. The Soviet economy increasingly was strained by the competing demands on it and by its own inefficiency. Soviet leaders hoped that better relations and increased trade with the United States would result in the investment of Western capital in the Soviet economy and in the modernization of some of its industries.

During the period of detente, intercultural and scientific exchanges and trade greatly increased between the superpowers. More than a dozen agreements were signed to foster increased communication. Direct air service from Washington to Moscow was initiated. The most ambitious bilateral effort, the joint Apollo-Soyuz space mission, resulted in a space rendezvous between the two powers that was televised for the entire world to witness.

As the decade progressed, however, relations between the superpowers became increasingly strained. It seemed clear that each side had a different interpretation of detente and therefore had different expectations of it. The Americans expected detente to exert a moderating influence on Soviet foreign policy around the world. It was as if the U.S. leadership were saying to the Soviets: "If you want to remain our friend, you won't do things you know we won't like." For instance, the United States felt the Soviet Union violated the spirit of detente by providing arms to leftist guerrillas in Nicaragua and by attempting to increase its influence in Africa. On the other hand, the Soviets considered detente to be a bilateral relationship between the Americans and themselves that had little to do with their international conduct elsewhere. In response to U.S. charges that they jeopardized detente by their activities in Africa and Central America, the Soviets countercharged that the United States was interfering in their internal affairs. "Friendship between equals," the Soviets seemed to say, "is not a matter of one side doing the other's bidding."

As the 1970s progressed, world events that had originally made Americans more amenable to detente now made them want to reassert American preeminence in the world.

When a small group of student terrorists seized the American embassy in Iran and held the Americans there captive, fear that the United States had become a "toothless giant" created support for the "remilitarization" of America. Soon the military began to release figures indicating that the United States had not kept pace with the Soviets in arms spending. Although the assumptions used in compiling the figures were questioned, the press increasingly reported the existence of a "spending gap." When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in support of the socialist regime there, militarily suppressing the widespread dissent, the last vestiges of detente disappeared. (Soviet leaders have said they believed detente was dead before Afghanistan, killed by increasingly militant, anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States.) President Jimmy Carter imposed an embargo on the shipment of American grain to the Soviets and refused to allow U.S. participation in the 1980 Olympics held in Moscow.

Return to the Cold War or New Hope? The 1980s

By the 1980 U.S. presidential election, few Americans supported detente. In both countries, more militant, hawkish factions seemed to be gaining control of the debate over the direction in which U.S.-Soviet relations should proceed. The SALT II treaty, the most visible symbol of cooperative arms control efforts between the two nations, had been withdrawn from Senate consideration after strong opposition had threatened its ratification and after the Soviets had sent troops to Afghanistan.

The election of Ronald Reagan, known for his "hard-line" views on dealing with the Soviets, had many implications for U.S.-Soviet relations, which were already at a critical point. After he was elected, Reagan's key appointments in the areas of foreign policy and military policy were people who shared his commitment to taking a hard line with the Soviet Union. Believing that the United States should negotiate from a position of strength and that it had lost some of that strength during detente, the new administration increased both the U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons inventories. In 1983, Reagan proposed that the United States build a space-based nuclear defense system (known as the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars") that would shoot down nuclear missiles before they reached their targets. The Reagan administration also sought to weaken the Soviet Union by refusing to allow American firms to sell the Soviets high-technology goods and other materials needed by them for economic development. In addition, the administration continued its efforts to aid anticommunist movements in Central America, Afghanistan, and Africa.

The Soviets also contributed to the "new" Cold War. In 1983, a Soviet military pilot shot down a Korean passenger jet, killing more than two hundred people. Soviet leaders defended the action by claiming the jet was on a spy mission. Later that year, Soviet negotiators walked out of the arms control talks in Geneva in protest over the United States basing Pershing II missles in Western Europe. In 1984, Soviet athletes boycotted the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, claiming the United States could not guarantee their personal safety. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the fourth leader of the Soviet Union in less than three years—following Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko.

As tensions between the two nations increased, people worldwide became weary of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Public opinion turned against the buildup of military arsenals, and a global nuclear freeze movement began to attract more followers. Leaders of America's European allies—who believe that international cooperation and trade enhances their economic and military security—pressured Reagan to seek better relations with the Soviets. Gorbachev also sought to ease relations with the United States so that he could concentrate on reviving the crippled Soviet economy.

Photo: Terry Arthur/The White House

President Ronald Reagan and Communist Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during the 1985 summit in Geneva. The 1985 summit was the first time that the leaders of the two superpowers had met in nearly seven years.

In November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva,Switzerland. It was the first summit meeting between the two superpowers in almost seven years. The summit meeting left many issues—such as human rights in the Soviet Union, U.S. plans for a space-based defense system, and the involvement of both countries in the Third World—unresolved. But the two leaders did emphasize the need to avoid nuclear war and seek world peace. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union promised to reopen cultural exchanges, continue arms control talks, and hold future summit meetings in 1986 and 1987.

Living with One Another

The United States and the Soviet Union continue to focus, perhaps too heavily, on each other's military strength. Both nations know much about the number and quality of their opponent's weapons. But they remain concerned with what they do not know. And it is largely for that unknowable future that they plan. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union possess the capability to destroy each other, the massive effort required to maintain a military balance will continue to dominate their relationship. But that primary activity goes on within the context of economic, cultural, and diplomatic relations. It is those areas that provide the most flexibility for movement toward greater understanding.

One thing remains certain. With their great size, large populations, and imposing industrial strength, both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to dominate the world political scene. That scene is one in which the problems of world poverty, dwindling and polluted resources, and terrorism appear to be increasing. Cooperation between the two superpowers might offer at least partial solutions to those problems. Is peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union possible? Or are these giants destined to destroy themselves and much of the world with them?

Summary

■ In November 1917, the Bolsheviks, committed to the principles of communism and world revolution, came to power in Russia. U.S. and British leaders opposed the new Bolshevik regime because it took Russia out of World War I and because they felt threatened by the Bolshevik call for communist revolution in the West.

■ Between World War I and World War II, both the Soviet Union and the United States focused much of their attention inward. The Soviet Union underwent intense industrialization and modernization, but at great hardship to many of its people. The United States retreated from world affairs into a period of isolationism. After a decade of prosperity after World War I, the United States suffered a long economic depression.

■ During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought on the same side against the Germans and the Japanese. When peace was at hand, however, the former allies became enemies. The Soviet Union took control of the governments in Eastern Europe, using its military might to enforce its will. The United States gained unprecedented influence in Western Europe, using its economic power to rebuild Europe into an anti-Soviet bloc.

■ In 1962, after a decade of noncommunication, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves locked in a battle of wills. The Soviets had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, ninety miles from the U.S. shore. After a very tense week during which the threat of nuclear war hung over the world, the Soviets removed the missiles. The incident had important consequences: a) the Soviets became committed to building a nuclear weapons arsenal to rival that of the United States; and b) both nations realized that they had to increase communication and begin arms control negotiations.

■ In the 1960s, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union "thawed" slightly as the countries successfully negotiated a number of arms control agreements. However, competition for influence in newly independent Third World nations increased.

■ In 1972, Nixon's visit to Moscow and the signing of the SALT I treaty there signaled the official beginning of a period of peaceful coexistence, or detente, between the United States and the Soviet Union. During detente, many scientific and cultural exchanges took place, and trade greatly increased. The United States principally hoped to gain foreign policy benefits from detente, and the Soviet Union hoped to gain economic benefits.

■ Detente began to deteriorate as it did not meet the expectations of both nations. Another major arms control agreement was negotiated but met opposition in the United States. The Soviets continued to attempt to spread their influence aggressively throughout the world. In retaliation, the United States restricted the economic exchanges and trade on which the Soviets had counted. Anti-detente factions in both countries became more powerful, and Cold War propaganda in both countries increased. By 1980, detente was dead.

■ Current relations between the Soviet Union and the United States focus on nuclear weapons, especially Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Although little progress has been made in arms control negotiations in recent years, the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985 may lead to improved relations between the two nations. The Soviet nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 may also encourage the United States and the Soviet Union to review their nuclear arms policies. The nuclear meltdown, which exposed tens of thousands of people to deadly radiation and contaminated large tracts of farmland, demonstrated the dangers of nuclear technology and the necessity of controlling it.

A Critical Issue: The Arms Race

IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

- How has the development of nuclear weapons changed the U.S.-Soviet relationship?
- What is meant by deterrence?
- Did the concept of "mutual assured destruction" provide adequate deterrence?
- Given their past actions, is it likely that the United States and the Soviet Union would be content with a "tie," or equality, in the arms race?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of:
  a) land-based missiles?
  b) submarine-launched missiles?
  c) missiles dropped from bombers?
- According to Robert McNamara, what effect have American and Soviet perceptions of each other's military strength had on the arms race? Were these perceptions accurate?

In May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty that declared their intention "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament." Years later, it is clear that both sides have failed to achieve that goal. Why has a cessation in the nuclear arms race been so elusive? How did we get to the point where both nations, while declaring their desire for a reduction in arms, continue to add hundreds of weapons to their arsenals each year?

History of the Arms Race

The world got its first glimpse of the devastating power of atomic weapons on August 6, 1945, when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima in Japan. With that demonstration, the United States became the world's first nuclear power. However, its nuclear arsenal was small, as was the number of aircraft capable of delivering the weapons. The policy for using the weapons called for dropping them on industrial, urban areas needed by an enemy to support its war effort. Had the United States used atomic weapons against the Soviet Union during this period, it would have targeted the few large Soviet cities that then existed.

In 1949, the Soviet Union entered the nuclear "club" by successfully testing its first atomic bomb. In so doing, the Soviets established that they had developed the necessary technology, but it would remain some time before they had the necessary number of bombs and delivery vehicles to pose a credible nuclear threat. In the meantime, they relied on the strength of their large ground forces.

U.S. Nuclear Supremacy

The 1950s constituted a new low in U.S.-Soviet relations. With American fear of world Communist domination—fueled by the fall of the Nationalists in China, the Korean War, the McCarthy Communist-hunting hearings, and the suppression of dissent in Hungary by Soviet troops—an intense anti-Soviet fervor grew in the United States. The Soviets, fighting political instability after the death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin and an economy virtually destroyed by World War II, viewed the atomic bomb-dropping Americans as the real threat to world peace and their own existence.

Throughout the 1950s, the United States remained the only country with a nuclear arsenal of any size. Limited resources and technology prevented the Soviets from developing a comparable force. But the Soviets maintained a huge army, which many in the West feared was capable of sweeping through Western Europe. A standoff de-

veloped between U.S. nuclear arms and Soviet conventional (or nonnuclear) forces. The United States was seen as providing a protective "nuclear umbrella" over Western Europe and its other allies.

During this period, the United States continued to target most of its nuclear weapons against highly populated Soviet industrial centers. Although some military strategists advised targeting more Soviet weapons centers and forces, there were technical arguments against doing so. Principally, the United States did not have adequate information about the precise locations of Soviet forces, and U.S. nuclear weapons did not yet have the high degree of accuracy that would be necessary to count on hitting the much smaller *counterforce* targets.

Had a nuclear war developed during the 1950s, all assumed that it would be over quickly, in a short, incredibly destructive spasm. The possibility of such a war occurring was heightened by the almost total lack of communication between the world's two strongest powers.

When the Soviet Union successfully launched its Sputnik satellite in 1957, Americans were shocked and frightened. By placing a satellite in space the Soviets indicated that they had developed the capacity to launch missiles in a long-distance trajectory. They were now capable of sending missiles from Soviet soil to hit targets on U.S. soil. American leaders feared the worst. The United States began an unprecedented effort to "match the Soviets in space." The mating of military and industrial efforts during this period formed the basis of what came to be known in the United States as the "military-industrial complex." History has shown that the U.S. reaction was in fact an overreaction. The Soviets may have launched a satellite successfully, but they had neither the launchers nor the missiles to pose a serious nuclear threat to the United States. This was to be the first of several times when U.S. leaders would credit the Soviet Union with strength it did not possess, and would then proceed to develop a military capacity that far outstripped that of their adversary.

The Soviets Catch Up

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 caught both nations by surprise. The United States was shocked to learn that the Soviet Union had installed nuclear missiles and bombers only ninety miles from Florida. Having nuclear weapons only minutes away posed a serious threat to U.S. security. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev seemed just as surprised that a move he had designed apparently for political effect had brought the two nations to the brink of nuclear war. The Soviet Union did not possess a nuclear arsenal strong enough to challenge the United States effectively. As a result, Khrushchev was forced to back down. The crisis became an international embarrassment for the Soviets and helped lead to Khrushchev's fall.

The new Soviet leadership decided to devote whatever national resources were needed to build a nuclear arsenal that could compete with the United States. They were determined that the Soviet Union would achieve equal status as an international "superpower" and believed that having a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the Americans was necessary to gain that recognition.

As the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals grew, both sides realized that, if one country launched an attack, it could destroy much of the enemy's country, but not all of the enemy's missiles. The enemy could then launch its surviv-



ing missiles against the attacker. In other words, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could attack the other without destroying itself. This ability to launch a devastating counterattack, which deters other countries from attacking in the first place, is known as *deterrence*. In the 1960s, deterrence became known as mutual assured destruction (MAD).

The declared strategic policy under MAD was that each nation would target the other's cities, thereby holding the population and industrial base of each country "hostage." Destroying the Soviet and American societies was obviously "unthinkable," and therefore the concept of MAD was believed to make nuclear war "unthinkable."

But as U.S. technology and information about Soviet forces improved, some American defense planners saw the possibility of targeting only military targets. Such an approach would spare millions of lives yet still give an American president the option of using nuclear force against the Soviet Union. However, the big question was whether or not a nuclear conflict would remain limited to strictly military targets, or if it would inevitably escalate to all-out nuclear holocaust. But because Soviet missiles were not highly accurate, the only Soviet choices in a "limited" nuclear exchange would be to surrender or to strike major U.S. cities. Therefore, the logic of mutual assured destruction remained the principal deterrent to nuclear war throughout the 1960s.

Why the Arms Race Spirals Upwards:
An Interview with
Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
(reprinted from the *Washington Post*, August 1, 1982)

In 1960, many people in the United States believed there was a missile gap favoring the Soviets. With hindsight it became clear there wasn't any missile gap, but President Kennedy had been told there was. What actually happened was this: In the summer of 1960, there were two elements in the U.S. intelligence community disagreeing on the relative levels of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One element greatly overstated the level of the Soviet nuclear force. When the other looked over the data, they didn't justify this conclusion. And within two years of that time, the advantage in the U.S. warhead inventory was so great vis-à-vis the Soviets that the air force was saying that they felt we had a first-strike capability and could, and should, continue to have one. If the air force thought that, imagine what the Soviets thought. And assuming they thought that, how would you expect them to react? The way they reacted was by substantially expanding their strategic nuclear weapons program.

When they began expanding their nuclear weapons program, we sat back here and saw they were building submarines, missiles, and planes and experimenting with new warheads at such a rate that we had to respond. We probably overresponded because it is likely that their capability, which we observed, exceeded their intentions. So you have an action-reaction phenomenon. And the result is that, during the last twenty-five years and particularly during the last fifteen, there has been a huge buildup, much more than people realize, in the nuclear strength of these two forces. That has changed the nature of the problem and increased the risk greatly.

Strategic Equality

In February 1970, President Richard Nixon appeared before Congress to question the wisdom of relying solely on the "hostage population" deterrent of MAD. He said:

> Should a president, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined, and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

Thus, Nixon was laying the groundwork for U.S. public nuclear policy to match more closely its actual policy of targeting forces in addition to cities.

But many strategic policy experts questioned the wisdom of moving away from MAD, with its "nuclear war is unthinkable" quality. Under MAD, a finite number of weapons would assure a nation's survival. Defense planners could calculate the number of nuclear weapons needed to destroy the enemy's population and industrial base. The prospect of such devastation was the deterrent to nuclear war. Additional nuclear weapons were therefore unnecessary. With *counterforce targeting* (aiming missiles at the enemy's nuclear forces), nations would require vast numbers of nuclear weapons because, in theory, limited nuclear exchanges could continue until one side ran out of nuclear weapons. Of particular concern was the potential growth of the military budget if the United States shifted to an avowedly counterforce strategy.

As the debate progressed in the United States, the Soviet Union continued to increase and upgrade its own nuclear forces. As the Soviets increased the accuracy of their missiles to a point approaching that of American missiles, their own counterforce abilities increased. It was only logical that the Soviets increasingly would target weapons sites as the Americans were doing.

The Current State of the Arms Race

Many U.S. political leaders believe that the United States fell dangerously behind the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons during the 1970s. They pushed for a massive U.S. arms buildup to "match" the Soviets. After the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the United States spent large amounts of money on defense and expanded its nuclear arsenal. In the meantime, the Soviet Union continued to





All photos courtesy of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The United States and the Soviet Union have developed nuclear arsenals that are based on a triad, or three-legged, system. Both nations are capable of launching nuclear missiles from the land, air, or sea.

modernize its nuclear force to meet the increasing challenges of the United States.

The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

U.S. nuclear defense is based on a triad, or three-legged, system: air, land, and sea. The air leg of the triad is made up of jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs and relatively small missiles to targets anywhere in the world. The land-based leg of the triad is made up of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), housed in silos in the continental United States. ICBMs are designed to fly long distances to reach their targets. The final leg of the triad is made up of missiles launched from submarines, known as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Each leg of the triad has unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, the submarines carrying SLBMs are extremely mobile; their positions are nearly impossible to detect, and therefore they are thought to be very secure from enemy attack. However, SLBMs are less accurate and not as powerful as ICBMs. On the other hand, ICBMs are extremely accurate, yet their fixed positions make them relatively easy targets for Soviet missiles. Jet bombers, the oldest element of the triad, can strike almost anywhere in the world, but they are slower than ICBMs or SLBMs and risk being detected by Soviet radar. Future technological developments may enhance the ability of bombers to penetrate Soviet air space undetected.

Most U.S. missiles are equipped with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Each MIRV carries more than one nuclear warhead. When the missile reaches the general area of its destination, it releases its nuclear warheads to streak off to their individual targets. Each MIRV has the destructive power of several non-MIRV missiles. The new American ICBMs—known as the MX—are equipped with up to ten MIRVs. American SLBMs can carry up to fourteen MIRVs.

In 1983, President Reagan announced a plan to build a space-based nuclear defense system that would destroy incoming ICBMs. Reagan's plan—known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars"—opened a new era in the arms race. The Soviets bitterly opposed the system, arguing that it would upset the nuclear balance between the two countries and expand the arms race into outer space. The Reagan administration, however, claims that SDI will make nuclear weapons obsolete and has lobbied Congress to vote funding for research into SDI.

The Soviet Nuclear Arsenal

The Soviet Union also depends on a triad nuclear defense system. The Soviets possess the largest number of SLBMs in the world, although a much smaller percentage of their missiles have MIRVs. Their arsenal also includes bombers that are capable of reaching the United States with refueling. The Soviets heavily depend on land-based ICBMs for their nuclear defense. Because they have traditionally been behind the United States in missile accuracy, the Soviets have concentrated on building "heavy" bombs, capable of imposing more widespread destruction.

Recent developments in the Soviet nuclear arsenal include the testing of a mobile ICBM, the introduction of a new generation of nuclear bombers, and the upgrading of its nuclear submarine force.

Plotting a Course for the Future

In 1986, Soviet leader Mihkail Gorbachev proposed a three-stage plan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the face of the earth by the year 2000. Although his proposal went further than previous Soviet offerings, it was met with skepticism by the Reagan administration. The Reagan administration is convinced that a space defense system—such as the one offered by the president's SDI program—is the best way to eliminate nuclear weapons forever.

As the United States and the Soviet Union continue to propose solutions to the arms race, the most fundamental question remains: Can the two most powerful countries on earth harness the technological genie that broke out of the bottle in 1945? Nuclear technology is producing more complex and powerful weapons systems every year. A leader's miscalculation or a mechanical malfunction could be devastating. The accidental meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986 is a powerful reminder of the dangers posed by even peaceful nuclear technology. If the two superpowers cannot control this technology, instead allowing it to drive the arms race as in the past, then the threat of nuclear destruction will always dominate U.S.-Soviet relations.

Summary

■ In the 1950s, the United States had unquestioned superiority over the Soviets in nuclear arms. During the 1960s, the Soviets devoted great effort to "catch up" to the United States. In the 1970s, technological advances allowed both nations to modernize their nuclear arsenals greatly. However, domestic problems in the United States reduced the amount of money that the United States could devote to arms modernization. In the 1980s, the United States increased its defense spending to modernize its nuclear arsenal. The United States also has begun research on a program called the Strategic Defense Initiative, which would place a nuclear defense system in outer space.

■ *Deterrence* is a concept that means that one nation is deterred, or prevented, from attacking another nation because it fears a devastating counterattack. In the 1960s, the basis of deterrence was a doctrine called mutual assured destruction (MAD). During the era of MAD, the United States and the Soviet Union aimed enough missiles at the other's cities and industrial centers to ensure that, if one was attacked, enough missiles would survive to destroy the attacker's society.

■ Technological advances in nuclear technology in the late 1960s made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to target weapons sites rather than entire cities. While this strategy had the advantage of sparing large portions of a society's population in time of war, some criticize it as encouraging the outbreak of war. Some analysts believe that deterrence does not work as well when a nation's leaders do not have to fear the assured destruction of their society.

■ Both the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals are made up of three types of weapons systems: land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and warheads dropped from airplanes.

■ The Soviets have more missiles than the United States, but U.S. missiles are more accurate than Soviet missiles. Most U.S. and Soviet defense planners believe that the two nations have reached "essential equivalence" in the arms race. This means that, although the weapons systems of the two are not exactly comparable, their overall capabilities of inflicting damage are roughly equal.

In Pursuit of Peace

IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

The articles in this chapter have been written by U.S. and Soviet leaders who have watched the U.S.-Soviet relationship for a long time. Some of their observations are the same, some are different. If you can answer the following questions after reading this section, you have understood what each author has tried to express.

- **In 1957, General Bradley predicted that the arms race would lead to what end? Have the years since proven him right or wrong?**
- **What hope does General Bradley see for overcoming the threat to civilization posed by a spiralling arms race?**
- **What does Ambassador Dobrynin mean by the "common era"?**
- **According to Ambassador Dobrynin, what immediate steps are necessary to achieve an end to the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union?**
- **Why does the Soviet Union object to President Reagan's "Star Wars" plan?**
- **Why does Ambassador Toon think Americans should view the U.S.-Soviet relationship with emotional detachment?**
- **How important to the U.S.-Soviet relationship are U.S. allies in Western Europe?**
- **According to Ambassador Toon, how should the United States manage its relationship with the Soviet Union?**

No one knows the future of the world. Some predict nuclear devastation, chaos, and horror. Others foresee a return to the decentralized village life of the past. Still others predict the rise of a world government.

The doomsayers' predictions of an imminent end to the world have been with us for centuries, along with the optimism of countless generations that continue to bring new life into the world in the hope that someone will find a way to secure peace, end hunger, or otherwise improve the quality of life.

When we think of the future of the world, we think about the fragile, usually hostile relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers possess the ability to eliminate each other's populations from the face of the earth along with the rest of the world. At the same time, these two nations have the power to promote progress on earth. Both have the resources to further medical advances, to explore space, and to end world hunger.

Will the U.S.-Soviet relationship move toward a nuclear war or toward peaceful collaboration in facing world problems? In this section, distinguished U.S. and Soviet leaders give their opinions of the direction in which U.S.-Soviet relations should proceed.

Address to the Students at St. Alban's School

By Omar Bradley

The following speech was given by General Omar Bradley at the St. Alban's School in Washington, D.C., on November 5, 1957; however, it could be given today. Does that mean that U.S.-Soviet relations are more stable than they sometimes appear? Or does it mean that we are unable to change things for the better? General Bradley died in 1981 at age eighty-eight, still concerned about the issues he addresses below.

The central problem of our time—as I view it—is how to employ human intelligence for the salvation of mankind. It is a problem we have put upon ourselves. For we have defiled our intellect by the creation of such scientific instruments of destruction that we are now in desperate danger of destroying ourselves. Our plight is critical, and with each effort we have made to relieve it by further scientific advance, we have succeeded only in aggravating our peril.

As a result, we are now speeding inexorably toward a day when even the ingenuity of our scientists may be unable to save us from the consequences of a single rash act or a lone reckless hand upon the switch of an uninterceptable missile. For twelve years now, we've sought to stave off this ultimate threat of disaster by devising arms that would be both ultimate and disastrous.

This irony can probably be compounded a few more years, or perhaps even a few decades. Missiles will bring antimissiles; antimissiles will bring anti-antimissiles. But inevitably, this whole electronic house of cards will reach a point where it can be constructed no higher.

At that point, we shall have come to the peak of this whole incredible dilemma into which the world is shoving itself. And when that time comes, there will be little we can do other than to settle down uneasily, smother our fears, and attempt to live in a thickening shadow of death.

Should this situation come to pass, we would have but one single thin thread to cling to. We call it rationale or reason. We reason that no government, no single group of people—indeed, not even one willful individual—would be so foolhardy, so reckless as to precipitate a war that would most surely end in mutual destruction.

The reasoning may have the benefit of logic. But even logic sometimes goes awry. How can we assume that reason will prevail in a crisis when there is ordinarily so little reason among people? To those who take comfort in the likelihood of an atomic peace to be secured solely by rationale and reason, I would recall the lapse of reason in a Nazi bunker under the Reich Chancellery in Berlin in 1945. It failed before, it can fail again.

Have we already gone too far in this search for peace through the accumulation of peril? Is there any way to halt this trend—or must we push on with new devices until we inevitably come to judgment before the atom? I believe there is a way out. And I believe I have acquired in my lifetime a decent respect for human intelligence.

It may be that the problems of accommodation in a world split by rival ideologies are more difficult than those with which we have struggled in the construction of ballistic missiles. But I believe, too, that if we apply to these human problems the energy, creativity, and the perseverance we have devoted to science, even problems of accommodation will yield to reason.

Admittedly, the problem of peaceful accommodation in the world is infinitely more difficult than the conquest of space, infinitely more complex than a trip to the moon. But if we will only come to the realization that it must be worked out—whatever it may mean even to such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty—I believe that we, somehow, somewhere, and perhaps through some as yet undiscovered world thinker and leader can find a workable solution.

I confess that this is as much an article of faith as it is an expression of reason. But this, my friends, is what we need—faith in our ability to do what must be done. Without that faith we shall never get started. And until we get started, we shall never know what can be done.

If I am sometimes discouraged, it is not by the magnitude of the problem, but by our colossal indifference to it. I am unable to understand why—if we are willing to trust in reason as a restraint on the use of a ready-made ready-to-fire bomb—we do not make greater, more diligent, and more imaginative use of reason and human intelligence in seeking an accord and compromise that will make it possible for mankind to control the atom and banish it as an instrument of war.

This is the real and indeed the most strenuous challenge to man's intellect today. By comparison with it, the conquest of space is of small significance. For until we learn how to live together, until we rid ourselves of the strife that mocks our pretensions of civilization, our adventures in science—instead of producing human progress—will continue to crowd it with greater peril.

We can compete with a Sputnik and probably create bigger and better Sputniks of our own. But what are we doing to prevent the Sputnik from evolving into just one more weapons system? And when are we going to muster an intelligence equal to that applied against the Sputnik and dedicate it to the preservation of this satellite on which we live?

How long—I would ask you—can we put off salvation? When does humanity run out? If enough of us believe strongly enough in the ability of intelligent human beings to get together on some basis of a just accord, we might somehow, somewhere, in some way, and under some auspices make a start on it.

Unless we soon get started, it may be too late. We can't sit about waiting for some felicitous accident of history that may somehow make the world all right. Time is running against us, and it is running against us with the speed of a Sputnik.

If we're going to save ourselves from the instruments of our own intellect, we had better get ourselves under control soon and begin making the world safe for living.

A Soviet View of the "Common Era"

By Anatoly F. Dobrynin

Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986. Currently, he heads the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee Secretariat. On the eve of the twenty-seventh Soviet Party Congress, Ambassador Dobrynin commented on the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the prospects of the two superpowers reaching an arms control agreement in the future. Ambassador Dobrynin's comments are taken from an article that appeared in the Washington Post *in February 1986.*

In the twenty-four years that I have spent in Washington, I have witnessed many crucial junctures in Soviet-American

relations. There have been some great moments of hope and, alas, some enormously frustrating lost opportunities. But it's not easy to remember a period when so much was at stake as now, because the decisions soon to be made will determine without doubt the future—not only ours, but our children's and grandchildren's. For what is going to happen in 1986 will shape the nature of the long-term relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States into the twenty-first century, into the third millenium of what we call the Common Era.

These very words—common era—have acquired a new meaning nowadays because, for good or for bad, our two nations can only survive together, or perish together. It's an illusion to believe that one country can safeguard its security at the expense of the other. Like it or not, the age of invulnerability belongs to history. Nobody today is immune from the danger of the nuclear holocaust. That means that you can't have security if we don't have it, and vice versa. That means that we can have either common security or common Armageddon. That's what "common era" means in 1986.

The choice we face is obvious: Shall we keep on building weapons of mass destruction and bring the logic of the Stone Age beyond the limit of our planet, making even heaven into a high-tech battlefield? Or should we come to our senses—common sense—and realize that counting on a bigger stick or X-ray laser is hopelessly outdated, that we cannot gamble forever with our existence as nations, as societies, as human beings?

My country has made its choice—the Soviet people do not reject mutually beneficial cooperation with others. We know that peace doesn't depend on our efforts alone. Rather, peaceful relations depend on developing a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fresh ideas on preserving peace and consolidating international stability will be at the heart of Soviet foreign policy in the coming years. For we believe that despite the dangers of today's world, there are real opportunities to break the vicious circle of action and reaction in the arms race.

It's difficult to underestimate the importance of the Soviet arms control proposals recently made by General Secretary Gorbachev. This historic program proposes practical and realistic three-stage measures to get rid of nuclear weapons by the end of this century. At the first stage of nuclear disarmament, we propose to cut by half both the Soviet and American systems that can strike the territory of the other side. At further stages, we envisage more drastic reductions until all nuclear weapons on our planet are eliminated.

Nobody thinks this will be easy to achieve. But it's high time to begin. And even before reductions are completed, or even started, a simple but very effective step can be taken to put the brakes on the nuclear arms race: discontinuing nuclear tests. My country proved that it means business when it unilaterally stopped underground testing more than seven months ago. We extended this moratorium once, and we are ready to keep it indefinitely if we're joined

Photo: Novosti Press Agency

View of the Kremlin with Lenin's tomb and Red Square in the foreground. According to Ambassador Dobrynin, the new Soviet leadership is intent on ending the arms race between the superpowers.

by the United States. It's not enough to wish that nuclear weapons become "impotent and obsolete" when you can prove your sincerity by practical deeds.

And we shouldn't be captive to a false dilemma—all or nothing. Instead, we should use existing opportunities right now. We believe that, as a first step, it's possible to defuse nuclear confrontation where it is most acute—in Europe. Thus we propose that, apart from other problems, Soviet and American medium-range nuclear weapons should be eliminated in the European zone. The only condition is that these reductions shouldn't be used to channel the arms race in other directions. Thus we think it is fair to expect that Britain and France wouldn't build up their nuclear stockpiles and that the United States wouldn't transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries.

People who are skeptical about nuclear disarmament claim that verification is an insurmountable obstacle. We don't think so. Verification is not a problem as far as we are concerned. We propose that on site inspections should be used along with national technical means. We are prepared for any other additional verification measures. But we mean verification of weapons reductions, not of the arms race.

That's why we strongly object to the weaponization of outer space. You cannot disarm on earth while arming the heavens. Star Peace, not Star Wars—that's our approach. We are sure that radical nuclear arms reductions can stabilize our relationship only if outer space will remain weapons-free.

Let's adjust to the mentality of the "common era" and see that, while so many things divide us, outer space can bring us together—recognizing the common goal of humankind, offering boundless opportunities for international peaceful cooperation and joint ventures. The explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 shows the enormous dangers that await the heroic men and women who lead the way. But, I think, it also reminds us that exploring the expanses of outer space may provide a unique bond of kinship between our two space-faring nations that can open new scientific and technological opportunities and also bring people into the new frontiers of friendship and cooperation.

We are looking forward to the U.S. government's positive response to our arms control initiatives. It is our hope that our two nations will build on the momentum these initiatives have created and move toward a successful arms control agreement in the future.

Photo: Close Up Foundation

The U.S. Capitol with the Senate chamber in the foreground. Ambassador Toon recommends that Washington pursue U.S.-Soviet relations in the future with a clear understanding of Soviet intentions.

Managing Our Relations With Moscow

By Malcolm Toon

A career diplomat, Malcolm Toon has served as the U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia (1969-71), Yugoslavia (1971-75), Israel (1975-76), and the Soviet Union (1976-79). In his article, Ambassador Toon says that the United States must view the U.S.-Soviet relationship within realistic boundaries and not through "rose-colored" glasses.

Midway in his second term, President Ronald Reagan made modest progress toward resolution of the key issue in foreign policy that has confronted every president since World War II—the development of a safe and rational relationship with Moscow. This sort of relationship is what all concerned Americans want, what our friends and allies expect, and what world stability and peace in the years ahead require. The problem is not an easy one, and its resolution will take years of effort, patience, and forbearance by both sides. Anyone who thinks otherwise ignores the past record of our relations with Moscow.

Our relationship with Moscow—since President Roosevelt first recognized the Soviet regime in 1933—has been far from constant and even. It has been essentially one of ups and downs. It has ranged from euphoria to despair, from excessive chumminess to dangerous hostility. And despite the resumption of arms control negotiations and the renewal of a degree of high-level dialogue at Geneva in November 1985, our relationship is still marked by hostility. It is better, perhaps, than before Geneva when our relations were at their lowest ebb since the days of the Cold War, but it is still far from satisfactory.

We should examine the ups and downs, the swings of the pendulum that have marked our relations over the past forty years. These swings tell us much about our national tendency to get carried away—from euphoria when things are going well to despair when they are not. We will continue to be frustrated in our efforts to arrive at a soundly

Photo: Terry Arthur/The White House

President Reagan and Soviet Leader Gorbachev during their 1985 summit conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Can the leaders of the two superpowers overcome their historical, political, and cultural differences to achieve a peaceful coexistence with each other?

based relationship with the Soviet Union until we learn to control our excessive swings in public mood. I feel strongly that we can avoid these swings, but only if we learn some basic truths about the Soviet system and if we then conduct our relations with Moscow without illusion and with minimal emotion.

Above all, it is essential that we recognize that Soviet long-range political objectives have changed little since 1917. They continue to seek a world responsive to Moscow's will. However, because Soviet leaders recognize that war would be suicidal, their strategy has been to achieve their aims by political means, subversion, and seduction—limiting their use of military power to areas where they can move with impunity. Obviously, such a strategy pursued by an expansionist, heavily armed adversary gives us little comfort, but it should not lead us to conclude that a soundly based relationship with the Soviet Union is impossible. Such a relationship is possible, but only if it is carefully conceived and free of all illusions about the true nature of the Soviet threat.

After a rather unsettling start, President Reagan, it seems to me, is now on the right track. While seeking to maintain a strong military posture, he is prepared to work out a constructive relationship with Moscow, discussing both regional issues that divide us and renewed arms control negotiations. We cannot be certain that we can mend the damage done to our relationship by the harsh rhetoric from both capitals over the past four years, but we must make the effort.

As we try to manage our affairs in the interest of improved stability, we should recast our relationship within the following parameters:

1. We should have the self-confidence to carry on an effective dialogue with the Soviets. They are tough negotiators, but they are not nine feet tall.

2. We should have the courage and wisdom to forge solutions to the problems that divide our two countries, bearing in mind that our proposals, if they are to be negotiable, must be perceived by the Soviets as not against their interests. This is particularly true in arms control where more flexibility must characterize the attitudes of both Moscow (on verification) and Washington (on SDI) if we are to reach useful agreements.

3. We should avoid bluffs and idle threats. Now that the Soviets are at least our military equal, they cannot be intimidated and they cannot be bluffed—particularly in areas where they feel their vital interests are at stake.

4. We should recognize that the Soviets pay attention to what we do, not what we say. Adequate military underpinning and deployment are essential if our policies are to be credible.

5. We should avoid loosely worded agreements, based on broad principles. All agreements should be specific, self-enforcing, and adequately verifiable.

6. We should share with our allies an illusion-free assessment of the Soviet threat. This will require us to reach agreement with our friends in Europe and Japan on our perceptions of the Soviet threat since our views differ substantially. Nevertheless, it is essential that we move in concert.

7. We should be alert to Soviet attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies—particularly now, with a Soviet leadership much more adept at spotting and exploiting areas of friction within the Western alliance.

8. We should take a rational view toward summit meetings. To be productive, a summit meeting must be carefully planned and geared to a specific political objective. And we should recognize that future summits cannot parallel the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. That is, they must produce something of substance. Summits will fail if viewed by the world as simply get-acquainted sessions.

9. We should avoid chumminess. Good faith and trust are out of the question, given Soviet ideology and behavior. We and the Soviets differ fundamentally on both principles and objectives. But we do seem to share a determination to avoid dangerous confrontations that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. We should build on this shared rationality rather than on imagined convergence of views on the political issues that divide us.

Glossary

Anti-ballistic missile (ABM): Any missile capable of destroying enemy nuclear missiles in flight. It may be armed with any sort of weapon (laser, nuclear, or conventional).

Bilateral treaty: A treaty that exists between two nations and is binding on them alone.

Bipolar politics: Politics based on a view of the world as split between two rival camps, those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bolshevik: The Russian word for "majority." It was originally applied to the majority faction within the Social Democratic Labor Party prior to the Russian Revolution. That faction, headed by Lenin, favored immediate overthrow of the Czarist regime rather than the gradual reform favored by the Mensheviks, or minority faction.

Capitalism: An economic system based on private ownership of property, production of goods for profit, and competition among producers. Prices and wages are generally, but not always, related to the supply of and demand for a particular good or service.

Cold War: The state of hostilities that has existed between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II without the actual outbreak of military combat. The weapons used in such a war are primarily economic, diplomatic, and rhetorical.

Command economy: An economy in which major decisions, such as investment of resources, levels of production and distribution, and prices and wages, are set by a centralized decision-making body.

Communism: An economic system based on the principle of communal ownership of property, and distribution of goods and services based on each person's need. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels describe communism as the final stage of socialism in which all class differences would disappear and people would live in harmony. Lenin added the concept of an elite communist party that would direct the nation's development.

Counterforce: A strategy in which a nation targets its weapons against the weapon sites, military installations, and military support systems of its enemy, instead of targeting the enemy's major population centers.

Demography: The study of population patterns within a nation. Such patterns may include size, geographic distribution, age distribution, and racial make-up.

Detente: A French word meaning "lessening of tension." It was applied to the U.S.-Soviet relationship between 1972 and 1979, when hostile rhetoric was at a minimum and political, cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation was at a height.

Geopolitics: The influence that a nation's size, location, terrain, natural resources, and population has on its political system and social structure. Geopolitical factors strongly influence the way a nation perceives its position in the world.

Ideology: The body of ideas that reflect the needs and goals of a person or group.

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): A rocket capable of carrying a warhead—usually nuclear—over great distances.

Interdependence: A relationship in which nations develop mutual interests to a point at which they need each other to successfully meet their individual goals.

Intermediate range nuclear forces (INF): Nuclear weapons with a range of 1,500 to 3,000 miles.

Politburo: The Political Bureau of the Communist Party, a small group of top Party officials who make the most important decisions concerning the direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Secularization (of society): The transformation of a society from a religious orientation to a civil or nonreligious orientation.

Socialism: An economic system in which the state owns the means of production and controls the distribution of goods. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, socialism is a necessary stage in the development of communism.

Soviet: The Russian word for "council." Prior to the Russian Revolution such councils were composed of workers and soldiers who favored the overthrow of the Czar. Later they included peasants and became the standard forum for decision-making.

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM): Any nuclear missile transported by and launched from a ship.

Union republic: An administrative district within the Soviet Union that is home to an ethnically homogeneous population and that borders on a foreign country or the Baltic Sea; there are fifteen union republics in the Soviet Union.

Warhead: An explosive nuclear device delivered by aircraft and missiles.

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Notes

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